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In fear extinction, an animal learns that a conditioned stimulus (CS) no longer predicts a noxious stimulus [unconditioned stimulus
(UCS)] to which it had previously been associated, leading to inhibition of the conditioned response (CR). Extinction creates a new
CS–noUCS memory trace, competing with the initial fear (CS–UCS) memory. Recall of extinction memory and, hence, CR inhibition at
later CS encounters is facilitated by contextual stimuli present during extinction training. In line with theoretical predictions derived
from animal studies, we show that, after extinction, a CS-evoked engagement of human ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and
hippocampus is context dependent, being expressed in an extinction, but not a conditioning, context. Likewise, a positive correlation
betweenVMPFCandhippocampal activity is extinction context dependent. Thus, aVMPFC–hippocampal network provides for context-
dependent recall of human extinction memory, consistent with a view that hippocampus confers context dependence on VMPFC.
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Introduction
Learning to disregard a conditioned stimulus (CS) that no longer
predicts an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) is important for adap-
tive behavior in a changing environment. An observation, made
by Pavlov (1927), that extinguished conditioned responses (CRs)
can recover is widely interpreted as indicating that extinction
does not erase aCS–UCS association (“fearmemory”) but creates
a competing CS–noUCS association (“extinction memory”)
(Myers and Davis, 2002; Bouton, 2004; Delamater, 2004). Con-
text appears to be a critical regulatory factor in the expression of
this putative competition (Bouton, 2004). Thus, after extinction
training, the subsequent recall of an extinction memory with CS
presentation (i.e., the inhibition of the CR) shows a relative spec-
ificity to contexts that resemble those present during extinction
training (“extinction context”). In contrast, non-extinction con-
texts favor recall of fearmemory. Thismay reduce the probability
that a “true” danger cue is disregarded, which may be substan-
tially more costly (e.g., lethal) than reacting with fear to a “false”
danger cue.
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) is involved in
the storage and recall of extinction memories (Morgan and Le-
Doux, 1995; Milad and Quirk, 2002; Phelps et al., 2004; Milad et
al., 2005). VMPFC activation is necessary for extinction recall in
a time window of24–74 h after extinction training (Lebron et
al., 2004). The VMPFCmay contribute to CR inhibition via sup-
pression of the amygdala (Quirk et al., 2003; Rosenkranz et al.,
2003). A current theoretical model (Hobin et al., 2003) predicts
that CS-evokedVMPFC activation after extinction is restricted to
extinction contexts (is context dependent). Alternatively, the
VMPFC may be engaged whenever an extinguished CS is pre-
sented (be context independent), and a context dependence in
the recall of extinction memory may only be expressed in some
other interconnected region [e.g., in the amygdala (Hobin et al.,
2003)]. Therefore, the primary goal of this study was to examine
whether VMPFC activation is context dependent.
The hippocampus is a region that is classically associated with
contextual memory functions, including context-driven recall
(Hirsh, 1974; Kennedy and Shapiro, 2004). Thus, the hippocam-
pus is required for the recall of recent context-evoked fear mem-
ories (Anagnostaras et al., 2001). Not surprisingly, it has long
been hypothesized that the hippocampus contributes to context-
dependent recall of extinction memory (Frohardt et al., 2000;
Hobin et al., 2003; Sotres-Bayon et al., 2004). In its simplest form,
this contribution may take the form of rendering an extinction
memory accessible (Delamater, 2004) through activation of as-
sociations linking a current context with the previous experience
of extinction. At a neural level, the hippocampus may support
CS-evoked VMPFC engagement while in an extinction context.
Such contextual gating by the hippocampus of CS inputs into the
VMPFC should be evident in correlated CS-evoked activity in
both areas during recall of extinctionmemory. An additional goal
of this study was therefore to test whether CS-evoked hippocam-
pus activation after extinction is also (extinction) context depen-
dent and, if so, whether this activity positively correlates with
CS-evoked VMPFC activity.
A variant of a hippocampus-based model of context-
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dependent recall of extinctionmemorywas proposed byHobin et
al. (2003). The model takes into account the observation that
pretest lesions of the dorsal hippocampus in rats lead to a failure
to produce tone-evoked CRs, but only when the CR has been
extinguished previously (Corcoran and Maren, 2004; Corcoran
et al., 2005; Ji and Maren, 2005). Hobin et al. (2003) thus argued
that, after extinction, the hippocampus inhibits the VMPFC and
thus allows for CS-evoked amygdala activation (leading to a CR).
This block on the VMPFC would only be lifted where contextual
information signals it is more appropriate to inhibit the CR, such
as in the extinction context. In these instances, theVMPFCwould
act to inhibit the amygdala, preventing a CR. This model differs
from the simpler model described above in that it predicts CS-
evoked dorsal (or, in humans, posterior) hippocampus activation
in test contexts that differ from the extinction context. It further
predicts that CS-evoked hippocampus activation negatively cor-
relates with CS-evoked VMPFC activation in those contexts. A
final goal of this study was thus to test both the predictions de-
rived from the model by Hobin et al. (2003).
Materials andMethods
In brief, the experiment used a within-subject AB–AB design consisting
of pavlovian fear conditioning in context A and extinction in context B
on day 1. This was followed by testing of CS-evoked responses in both the
conditioning (A) and the extinction (B) contexts on day 2 (see Fig. 1).
Subjects
Seventeen normal healthy volunteers [mean (M) age, 25 years; age range,
18–34 years; nine males; right-handed] participated in the study. Sub-
jects were preassessed to exclude those with a previous history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric illness, including anxiety disorders. All subjects
gave informed consent, and the study was approved by the Joint Ethics
Committee of the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery.
Stimuli
Unconditioned stimulus. The UCS consisted of brief electric shocks to the
right hand. Shocks were applied using a Digitimer DS7A electrical stim-
ulator (Digitimer, Welwyn Garden City, UK) delivering electrical pulses
of up to 20mAand 1 or 2ms duration through a silver chloride electrode.
Stimulation parameters were individually adjusted before the experi-
ment to achieve maximum tolerable pain. To this end, subjects were
given a series of shocks, starting at a very low current level and slowly
increasing in amplitude, until the subject indicated he or she did notwant
to receive any higher stimulation. The subject was explicitly asked
whether the reached level was tolerable and could be used during the
subsequent experiment. Note that fear-related areas show lateralized CS
responses based onwhere the source of danger is located in space (Blair et
al., 2005; Kalisch et al., 2005). To increase the probability of finding
CS-evoked activation, we therefore applied the UCS to the same hand
(right) in all subjects. This prohibits inference about lateralization of
CS-evoked responses, such as observed in VMPFC and hippocampus
(see Results).
Conditioned stimuli. The two CSs (one CS, or CS, which was occa-
sionally paired with the UCS, and one CS, or CS, which was never
paired) consisted of onemale and one female face from the Ekman series
(Ekman and Friesen, 1976)whose hair was removed in viewof the gender
decision task (see below).Mildly (20%) angry faces were chosen based on
previous studies by our group showing successful conditioning and
amygdala activation with mildly angry-face CSs (Morris et al., 1998;
Critchley et al., 2002). The two same faces were used for all subjects. In 8
of the 17 subjects, the CSwas the male face, and, in the remaining nine
subjects, it was the female face.
Contexts. Conditioning and extinction occurred in two different con-
texts that were distinguished by background screen color and auditory
input. The screen color was either black or rhythmically changing be-
tween red and orange. The fixation mark was a white cross in the black
context and awhite dot in the red–orange context. Therewas no auditory
input in the black context, whereas in the red–orange context, subjects
heard two sounds of different pitch, presented over headphones, that
changed synchronously with the color of the screen. In 10 subjects, the
black context was the context in which conditioning occurred (condi-
tioning context or A) and the red-orange context was the context in
which extinction occurred (extinction context or B). In seven subjects,
the red–orange context was the conditioning context, and the black con-
text was the extinction context.
Task
Subjects were told that the studywould examine attentional performance
under stress and were only debriefed at the end of the study. The task was
a speeded gender decision task for which subjects signaled the gender of
the face by pressing the left (for female) or the right (for male) button on
a keypadwith the index ormiddle finger, respectively, of the right hand as
soon as they saw the face.
Design
Day 1 (discrimination learning). Subjects were first habituated to the CSs
and contexts by presenting eachCS three times in each context before the
actual experiment. Subjects then learned to discriminate the two CSs on
the basis of how they predicted danger. In conditioning block A1, the
CS and theCSwere each presented 10 times in a randomized order in
the center of the screen. The duration of CSs ranged from 2 to 8 s, with a
mean duration of 5.7 s per CS type (one CS of 2 and 3 s each, and twoCSs
of 5, 6, 7, and 8 s each per CS type). At 250 ms before the offset of the
CS, the UCS was applied. Those two CS presentations, which were
shorter than 5 s, were not coupled with a UCS, resulting in a reinforce-
ment ratio of 80%. Varying delays between CS and UCS onset were
meant to introduce additional uncertainty that would make condition-
ing somewhat more extinction resistant and therefore increase the like-
lihood of recall of fear memory on day 2 (see below). A minimum delay
of 5 s allowed us to measure conditioned skin conductance responses
(SCRs) to the CS without a confound from the subsequent uncondi-
tioned SCRs to the shock. CSswere separated by an interstimulus interval
(ISI) of 9 s, during which subjects saw a central fixation mark (low-level
baseline). The length of the ISI was chosen to avoid complete masking of
conditioned SCRs by preceding unconditioned SCRs to the shock.
In the following extinction block B1, which was different from the
preceding conditioning block in terms of screen color and auditory input
(see above), conditioned fear responses were extinguished by presenting
the same 20 CSs in the same manner but without shock. This was fol-
lowed by another conditioning block (A2) and another extinction block
(B2), each in their respective contexts. This design allowed subjects to
learn to discriminate between two different contexts on the basis of
whether the CS was (conditioning context) or was not (extinction
context) associated with the UCS. Each block lasted 6 min and the cor-
responding contextwas already present at the beginning of each block, 9 s
before CS presentation started. Blocks were separated by a break of 30 s,
duringwhich scanning continued but subjects were allowed to close their
eyes if they wanted.
At the end of day 1, the subjects were asked whether they had noticed
any relationship between the shock and the gender of the face and be-
tween the shock and the screen color.
Day 2 (test). Each context was again presented 18 times in an alternat-
ing order for a duration of 29 s each, separated by 5 s breaks. In nine
subjects, the experiment started with the conditioning context
(ABABAB. . . ), and, in eight subjects, it started with the extinction con-
text (BABABA. . . ). At the beginning of each block, the context was
present without any CS for 10 s. In 16 the 18 blocks of A and B each, one
CS and one CS were presented in random order for a duration of 5 s
each, followed by an ISI of 4 s each. In those 16A blocks, subjects received
a shock 3 s after the beginning of the block. This was meant to facilitate
recall of fear memory in context A, an effect that is difficult to achieve
because of ongoing extinction of CRs as a consequence of unreinforced
CS presentation on the test day.
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Autonomic monitoring
Skin conductance measurements were acquired at a sampling rate of
1000 Hz from electrodes on the middle and ring finger of the left hand
using an AT64 SCR apparatus (Autogenic Systems, Wood Dale, IL).
Imaging
Subjects were scanned on both days to maximize context identity across
days. Only data from day 2 are reported here. A 3 tesla MR head scanner
(Magnetom Allegra; Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) was used to acquire
gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPIs) with blood oxy-
genation level-dependent contrast (echo time, 30 ms; repetition time,
1.43 s; flip angle, 70°; slice tilt, 30°; z-shim gradient prepulse, 1
mT  m1  ms1). Each volume comprised 22 oblique axial slices of 2
mm thickness and 3  3 mm2 in-plane resolution with a slice gap of 1
mm. The slice package excluded the dorsal frontal, parietal, and occipital
cortices. These parameters produced EPIs in which signal dropout be-
cause of susceptibility-induced field inhomogeneities was minimized for
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (Deichmann et al., 2003). Subjects
were placed in a light head restraint within the scanner to limit head
movement during acquisition. A total of 980 (day 1) and 895 (day 2)
volumes were acquired continuously throughout the task, at 1.43 s inter-
vals, starting 14.3 s before onset of the experiment. As a result of the
above timings, there was no systematic temporal relationship between
the onsets of slices and stimuli, thus allowing for sampling, over the
course of the experiment, the entire length of the stimulus-driven hemo-
dynamic responses in each of the 22 slices.
A T1-weighted structural image was also acquired (Deichmann et al.,
2004).
Data analysis
Skin conductance data were downsampled to 100 Hz, mean filtered, and
then visually inspected for artifacts. Three subjects on day 1 and four
subjects on day 2 did not show any apparent SCR to the UCS and were
therefore excluded from additional skin conductance analysis, reducing
sample size to n 14 (day 1) and n 13 (day 2). In the following, an SCR
was defined as the maximum skin conductance in a time window of 5 s
after CS onset minus skin conductance at the time of CS onset (Buchel et
al., 1998). Data were z transformed to account for interindividual differ-
ences in physiological reactivity (Buchel et al., 1998).
As SCRs, reaction time (RT) data from the gender decision task were z
transformed. Response accuracy on both days was not significantly in-
fluenced by either context or CS type (CS vs CS) (repeated-measures
ANOVA) and ranged between 91.5 and 100% in the different conditions.
Significance of behavioral effects was assessed using paired t tests.
Because the previous literature provided directed hypotheses for both
learning (day 1) and test (day 2) effects on SCRs and RT (see Results), a
one-tailed threshold of p 0.05 was used throughout. RT data were also
analyzed using a nonparametricWilcoxon’s signed rank test, which gave
substantially the same results (data not shown).
Imaging datawere analyzed using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm) (Ashburner et al., 2004). The 10 initial images were discarded to
account for T1 equilibration. To correct formotion artifacts, imageswere
realigned to the 11th volume. Images were unwarped to correct for
movement-by-distortion interactions, spatially normalized to a standard
EPI template, spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full-
width at half-maximum(FWHM)of 4mm, temporally high-pass filtered
(cutoff, 128 s), and corrected for temporal autocorrelations using first-
order autoregressivemodeling. Statistical analysis was performed using a
standard approach for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
involving a general linear convolution model at the single-subject level
and a random-effects analysis at the group level (for details, see Friston et
al., 1994, 1995; Holmes and Friston, 1998; Penny and Holmes, 2004).
First, for each subject, condition-specific regressors were defined that
modeled the time course of the experimental events and, after convolu-
tion with a canonical hemodynamic response function, served as predic-
tors of the fMRI signal time courses at each voxel in the brain. CSs were
modeled as a series of events (i.e., a series of delta functions, separately for
CS in A, CS in A, CS in B, and CS in B). Additionally, these four
categorical regressors were parametrically modulated using trial-by-trial
z-transformed RTs as an index of the magnitude of the evoked CR.
Shocks were also modeled as events, whereas A and B blocks were mod-
eled as two separate boxcar regressors (0 for “off” and 1 for “on”). As
mentioned above, each regressor was convolved with a canonical hemo-
dynamic response function. Using these regressors in a general linear
model (multiple regression) of brain activation at each voxel yields pa-
rameter estimates of the contribution of each regressor to the fMRI signal
measured in each voxel. Contrasts, i.e., linear combinations of these
parameter estimates, were then calculated voxelwise to produce within-
subject estimates of effects of interests (e.g., the contrast CS CS in
context A, etc.). Statistical inference is obtained using a t statistic that
takes into account the magnitude of the contrast value and its SD. This
yields single-subject statistical parametric maps (SPM T maps) for each
contrast of interest. For the random-effects group analysis, the subject-
specific contrast images were spatially smoothed (FWHM, 10 mm) to
account for intersubject variation in the exact location of activations and
compared across the 17 subjects. Group effects were tested for signifi-
cance using voxelwise one-sample one-tailed t tests. To illustrate group
effect sizes in selected voxels (insets in the figures), group-level contrast
estimates were used. For planned post hoc t tests and regression analysis,
the subject-specific contrast estimates were extracted from the individual
smoothed contrast images. Correlation coefficients were compared with
each other using the test developed by Fisher (1921).
Voxels activated at a statistical threshold of p  0.001 are reported,
unless indicated otherwise. Correction for multiple comparisons follow-
ing Gaussian random field theory was limited to four predefined small
search volumes (left and right hippocampus, left and right VMPFC).
These were manually delineated on the mean structural image. The
VMPFC search volume excluded the subgenual cingulate cortex and was
dorsally delimited by a straight horizontal line between the anterior tip of
the genu and the cortical surface. These search volumes, as well as addi-
tional left and right amygdala masks, were also used to mask activation
images (SPM T maps) in Figures 3 and 4. Structural images were coreg-
istered onto functional images and spatially normalized using the non-
linear transformation estimated from the functional EPIs. Anatomical
localization was performed with reference to the atlas of Duvernoy
(1999). Hippocampal subregions along the rostrocaudal axis were
named according to the convention proposed by Amaral (1999). Coor-
dinates are described in the standard space defined by the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI).
Results
Context-dependent recall of extinction memory was studied us-
ing a novel within-subject AB–AB design (Fig. 1), developed spe-
cifically for purposes of fMRI. The design consists of pavlovian
fear conditioning in context A and extinction in context B on day
1, with testing of CS-evoked responses in both the conditioning
(A) and the extinction (B) contexts on day 2. We predicted pos-
itively correlatedCS-evoked brain activation in anatomically pre-
defined search volumes in (left and right) VMPFC and hip-
pocampus during test on day 2 in the extinction context B but not
in the conditioning context A. We also tested the hypothesis of
CS-evoked posterior hippocampus activation during test in the
conditioning context A, but not the extinction context B, and
whether this activation was negatively correlated with VMPFC
activation.
Context-dependent recall of extinction memory
Twelve of 17 subjects reported awareness of the CS–UCS con-
tingency, and 16 of 17 reported awareness of the context A–UCS
contingency when interviewed after the experiment on day 1.
SCRs from day 1 confirmed successful conditioning and context
discrimination (Fig. 2a). SCRs to the CSwere larger than to the
CS in A [(CSCS)A: M(CS) of 0.26; M(CS) of0.03;
t(13)  2.61; p  0.011, paired t test, one-tailed] but not in B
[(CSCS)B: M(CS) of0.09; M(CS) of0.14; t(13)
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0.92; p  0.188], resulting in a significant
context discrimination effect [(CS 
CS)A  (CS  CS)B: M([CS 
CS]A) of 0.28; M([CS  CS])B 
0.05; t(13) 2.0; p 0.033]. There were no
significant differential RT effects in the in-
cidental gender decision task (as described
in Fig. 1) (Fig. 2b).
Recall of fear memory (CR recovery) at
test is usually evident in augmented SCRs
(LaBar and Phelps, 2005; Milad et al.,
2005; Vansteenwegen et al., 2005) and/or
slower RTs (Dirikx et al., 2004;Hermans et
al., 2005) to CS compared with CS
stimuli. On day 2, we found no significant
differential SCR effects (Fig. 2a).However,
as predicted, RTs to the CS (relative to
the CS) in context A were significantly
slower than in context B [(CSCS)A
 (CSCS)B: M([CS  CS]A) of
0.16; M([CSCS]B) of0.12; t(16)
1.86; p  0.041] (Fig. 2b). This context-
discrimination effect was driven by slower
RTs to the CS versus the CS in context
A and faster RTs to the CS versus the
CS in context B, providing behavioral
evidence for recall of fear memory re-
stricted to the conditioning context. Sup-
plemental Figure 1 (available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material)
shows that the effect was not attributable
to changes in RTs to the CS but to slow-
ing of RTs to the CS in the conditioning
context A and quickening of RTs to the
CS in the extinction context B. The ab-
sence of SCR effects may reflect recall of
only some aspects of the CR 1 d after con-
ditioning (see Discussion).
fMRI data from day 2 were in agree-
ment with recall of fearmemory in context
A. Brain areas mediating CR recovery in A were identified from
the contrast (CS CS)A. Categorical effects were parametri-
cally modulated by trial-by-trial RTs as an index of CR magni-
tude. We observed activation in areas previously implicated in
fear responses [bilateral striatum (Jensen et al., 2003; Phelps et al.,
2004; Seymour et al., 2004; Wager et al., 2004), left temporal
cortex and cerebellum (Ploghaus et al., 1999; Wager et al., 2004),
hypothalamus (Simpson et al., 2001; Boshuisen et al., 2002), right
posterior hippocampus (Frohardt et al., 2000; Gray and Mc-
Naughton, 2000; Corcoran andMaren 2004; Ji andMaren, 2005);
all p 0.001 uncorrected, one-sample t test, one-tailed)] (Fig. 3a)
(supplemental Table 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mental material). We note that, at a more liberal threshold ( p
0.002 uncorrected), ventral left amygdala was also activated (Fig.
3b) (supplemental Table 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material). This finding is interesting given the pre-
sumed central role of amygdala in fear conditioning andmemory
(for review, see Buchel andDolan, 2000; Kim and Jung, 2006). To
our knowledge, this is the first indication in the human literature
that the amygdala is implicated in recall of a fear memory. The
result resonates with findings of amygdala activation in provoca-
tion paradigms in patientswith certain anxiety disorders inwhich
fear conditioning is a putative etiological mechanism (Cannis-
traro and Rauch, 2003). Together, the combined behavioral and
neural data show that, on day 2, CR recovery was restricted to the
conditioning context A. This is consistentwith successful recall of
extinction memory in context B, preventing expression of a CR.
VMPFC and anterior hippocampus activation during recall of
extinction memory
On the basis of the above data, we conjectured that, in our fMRI
analysis, areas supporting context-dependent recall of extinction
memory would show a contextual modulation of CS-evoked
activation. We examined this by testing for a categorical CS-by-
context interaction (CS  CS)B  (CS  CS)A in
VMPFC and hippocampus on day 2. In this contrast, no para-
metric modulation was used. We found a significant interaction
in left VMPFC [MNI coordinates (2, 42,22); p 0.048 after
small volume correction (SVC)] and left anterior hippocampus,
extending into entorhinal cortex [(24, 12, 32), p  0.011
SVC; (26, 18, 26), p  0.043 SVC) (Fig. 4a) (for uncor-
rected p values, see supplemental Table 1, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material). The interaction was
driven by a relatively greater activation to the CS than to the
CS in the extinction context B ( p 0.025, 0.021, and 0.08, post
hoc paired t tests, one-tailed, on subject-specific contrast esti-
mates), whereas, in the conditioning context A, activations were
Figure 1. AB–AB design. On day 1, subjects were fear conditioned to a CS (a face) through multiple pairings with a UCS
(electric shock) in context A (conditioning context, block A1). Fear responses were extinguished in context B (extinction context,
block B1) throughmultiple CSpresentations in the absence of theUCS. This procedurewas repeated in additional blocks (blocks
A2, B2), leading to robust context discrimination. As a control for nonassociative effects,we also used a nonpredictive CS (a face
of opposite gender) thatwas never pairedwith theUCS andpresented intermixedwith the CS. Contextswere defined by screen
color (black in one context, changing between red and orange in the other) and auditory input (two sounds, changing synchro-
nouslywith the color of the screen in the red–orange context only). Thesemarked physical differences between the two contexts
were intended to facilitate context discrimination. On day 2, subjects were tested for CS-induced recall of fear and extinction
memories in both contexts, each context being presented 16 times in alternating order. Recall of fearmemory in context A on day
2 was facilitated by additionally presenting one unpaired shock at the beginning of each context A block, thus again firmly
associating context A with the UCS. The task was a speeded gender decision task in response to the face stimuli. Gender of faces,
conditioning, and extinction contexts and the order of those contexts on day 2 were counterbalanced across subjects. Lightning
bolt, Electric shock.
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greater for the CS than for the CS ( p 0.1, 0.018, and 0.019,
one-tailed). Thus, as predicted, a CS-evoked activation of
VMPFC and (left anterior) hippocampus was specifically ex-
pressed in an extinction context. Greater activation for the CS
than for the CS in the conditioning context may reflect safety
signal properties of the CS, acquired during conditioning, in
this context.
Positive anterior hippocampus–VMPFC correlations during
recall of extinction memory
We next tested whether CS-evoked left anterior hippocampal
activation during recall of extinctionmemory was positively cor-
related with corresponding VMPFC activation. For this purpose,
we performed a group-level regression analysis in which subject-
specific contrast estimates of the contrast (CS  CS)B from
the peak activation in left anterior hippocampus [coordinates
(24,12,32)] were used as a regressor onwhole-brain (CS
 CS)B contrast maps. Using inclusive masking (masking
threshold, p  0.001 uncorrected), the search volume was re-
stricted to the above VMPFC interaction (as in Fig. 4a). There
was a positive correlation (r  0.715; p  0.0005, one-tailed) at
coordinates (4, 36, 26) (Fig. 3b). That is, individuals with
strong extinction-related hippocampal activation also had strong
extinction-related activation in VMPFC. This relationship was
specific for the extinction context B because the correlation be-
tween both voxels in the conditioning context A [contrast (CS
 CS)A; r  0.212; p  0.207, one-tailed] was significantly
smaller ( p 0.036, one-tailed Fisher’s test) (Fig. 4b). These data
are consistent with a simplemodel of hippocampal contributions
to context-dependent recall of extinction memory, stating that
information about the extinction context processed in the hip-
pocampus supports recall of the extinction memory in the
VMPFC, possibly through some hippocampal-dependent gating
of CS inputs into the VMPFC.
Posterior hippocampus
In contrast, the model of Hobin et al. (2003) predicts that the
posterior hippocampus is active specifically during recall of fear
memory in non-extinction contexts. In such contexts, the hip-
pocampus would inhibit the VMPFC and thus the recall of the
extinction memory outside an extinction context. The right pos-
terior hippocampus activation we observed during recall of fear
memory [contrast (CS  CS)A, modulated by RT (Fig. 3a)]
survived small volume correction for a right hippocampal search
volume ( p  0.045 SVC). Furthermore, as predicted by Hobin,
contrast estimates suggested conditioning context-specific acti-
vation (Fig. 3a, inset). However, the interaction contrast (CS
CS)A (CS CS)B, modulated by RT, did not reach sig-
nificance ( p  0.008 uncorrected; p  0.235 SVC). We thus
failed to find strong evidence for a (conditioning) context depen-
dence of posterior hippocampus activation.
This failure to observe context dependence in posterior hip-
pocampus may have been attributable to possible incomplete or
weak recall of fear memory in the conditioning context, as in-
dexed by a failure to find context-dependent SCRs on day 2 (see
above). Hence, to explore this question further, we ascertained
whether CS-evoked right posterior activation during recall of
fear memory was negatively correlated with corresponding
VMPFC activation.We performed another regression analysis in
which subject-specific estimates of the contrast (CS CS)A,
modulated by RT, from the peak activation in right posterior
hippocampus [coordinates (38, 32, 12)] were used as a re-
gressor on whole-brain (CS  CS)A contrast maps. Using
inclusive masking (masking threshold, p  0.001 uncorrected),
the search volumewas again restricted toVMPFC, as in Figure 4a.
We failed to find any correlation ( p  0.05 uncorrected), even
when lowering the masking threshold to p  0.05 uncorrected.
Figure 2. Successful discrimination learning and context-dependent recall. a, SCR. Larger
SCRs to the CS versus CS during fear conditioning in context A compared with the extinc-
tion contextBonday1 indicate learningof theCS–UCS contingency (fearmemory) in context
A and of the CS–noUCS contingency (extinctionmemory) in context B on day 1 (left). b, RTs.
Slower RTs to the CS versus CS in the conditioning context A comparedwith the extinction
context B on day 2 indicate recall of fearmemory in context A and recall of extinctionmemory in
B on day 2 (right). Scale: z scores (unit, SDs). z scores were used instead of raw values (micro-
ohms, seconds) to account for interindividual differences. *p 0.05, one-tailed.
Figure 3. Recall of fearmemory. Activations associatedwith recall of fearmemory on day 2.
a, Right (R) posterior hippocampus [MNI coordinates (38,32,12)]. b, Left (L) amygdala
[coordinates (28,2,32)]. Images show group-level estimates for the contrast (CS
CS)A, modulated by RT, display threshold p  0.01. Activations superimposed on mean
structural image, masked for hippocampus and amygdala. Insets, Group estimates for CS
CS contrasts in both contexts.
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Thus, we found no evidence that the pos-
terior hippocampus exerts inhibitory ac-
tion over extinction memories by sup-
pressing the VMPFC. In an analogous
regression analysis on whole-brain maps
of the contrast (CS  CS)A, modu-
lated by RT, we found no evidence for pos-
itive correlations between right posterior
hippocampus and amygdala that might
support a suggestion that the posterior
hippocampus supports recall of fearmem-
ory by directly interacting with the
amygdala.
Discussion
Our data provide evidence suggesting that
the recall of extinctionmemory in humans
is mediated by a network of brain areas,
including the VMPFC and the anterior
hippocampus. Interestingly, a similar, al-
though right-sided, VMPFC area to the
one observed here shows increased cortical
thickness in subjects with better extinction
recall performance (Milad et al., 2005).
There was no activation to the CS rela-
tive to the CS in this network in the con-
ditioning context. That is, the network
does not activate whenever an extin-
guished CS is presented but only when
contextual information signals the appro-
priateness of inhibiting the CR. This net-
work is therefore likely to form a neurobi-
ological substrate for the context
dependence of extinction recall (Bouton,
2004), a hypothesis that existing animal
(Sotres-Bayon et al., 2004) and human
(Phelps et al., 2004; LaBar and Phelps,
2005; Milad et al., 2005) studies have not
tested. The finding of extinction context-
specific relative activations in our study [as
opposed to the extinction-related deacti-
vations observed previously by others (La-
Bar and Phelps, 2005)] also supports the
general idea that extinction (and its recall)
is not simply a process of forgetting the
CS–UCS association but consists in creating (and later recalling)
a new CS–noUCS memory trace (Myers and Davis, 2002; Bou-
ton, 2004; Delamater, 2004).
Our data are consistent with the hypothesis that, during recall
of extinction memory, the hippocampus processes contextual
information supporting recall of thatmemory (Delamater, 2004)
and that this may confer (extinction) context dependence to
CS-evoked VMPFC activity. The reported correlations be-
tween hippocampus and VMPFC do not allow us to infer causal-
ity or directionality. We note, however, that a recent study of
recall of extinction memory in which the test context was identi-
cal to the conditioning and extinction contexts (“AAA design”)
found evidence of VMPFC, but not hippocampal, activation (La-
Bar and Phelps, 2005). In an AAA design, the context provides
ambiguous and thus essentially useless information with regard
to the competition between fear and extinction memory, and,
hence, the competition may simply be regulated by the relative
strength of the two memory traces. As a consequence, recall of
extinction memory in an AAA design may not require the hip-
pocampus. The model is also supported by evidence that the
hippocampus provides a major excitatory input to the VMPFC
(for review, see Sotres-Bayon et al., 2004) and that hippocampus-
to-VMPFC projections are considerably stronger than VMPFC-
to-hippocampus projections (Cavada et al., 2000). It is notewor-
thy that, in the rat, hippocampal VMPFC afferents stem from
subiculum and CA1 (Sotres-Bayon et al., 2004), which corre-
sponds to the location of the anterior hippocampal activation
observed in this study (Fig. 4).
Rat data have shown that lesions of the entire hippocampus or
fornix do not impair context-dependent recall of extinction
memory (Wilson et al., 1995; Frohardt et al., 2000). A study in
human patients yielded similar results (LaBar and Phelps, 2005).
However, in these experiments, lesions were present before con-
ditioning and extinction. This leaves open the possibility that
redundant systems provided for encoding and recall of context
information in the hippocampus-lesioned subjects. We suggest
Figure4. Recall of extinctionmemory.a, Activations associatedwith context-dependent recall of extinctionmemory onday 2.
Images show contrast (CS CS)B (CS CS)A, display threshold p 0.001, masked for VMPFC and hippocampus.
Activations are superimposed on mean structural image. Insets, Group-level estimates for CS CS contrasts in both con-
texts. b, CS-evoked left VMPFC activity is positively correlated with CS-evoked left anterior hippocampus activity in the
extinction context only. Left, Correlation in VMPFC in the extinction context, display threshold p 0.001, masked by VMPFC
activation in a. Right, An extinction context-specific correlation is apparent from the subject-specific estimates for the two CS
 CS contrasts (black: conditioning context, r 0.212, p 0.207, one-tailed; orange: extinction context, r 0.715, p
0.0005, one-tailed). L, Left.
9508 • J. Neurosci., September 13, 2006 • 26(37):9503–9511 Kalisch et al. • Context-Dependent Extinction
that the VMPFC normally receives contextual information from
the anterior hippocampus but can call on inputs fromother poly-
modal areas (Heidbreder and Groenewegen, 2003) when this
hippocampus area is dysfunctional.
Our data provide only limited evidence for the alternative
model by Hobin et al. (2003) positing a role of the posterior
hippocampus in regulating the fear versus extinction memory
competition. Although we found the predicted activation of
right posterior hippocampus during recall of fear memory,
this activation was not conditioning context specific. Also, we
did not find the predicted negative correlation with VMPFC
that could have been interpreted as indexing suppression of
extinction memories in a non-extinction context. Neverthe-
less, the idea that the hippocampus supports context-
dependent recall of fear memory has recently been strength-
ened by the finding of impaired context-specific reinstatement
in two hippocampal patients (LaBar and Phelps, 2005). Un-
fortunately, no information about the exact anatomy of the
lesion was available. Furthermore, the lesions occurred before
conditioning and extinction. We thus do not want to exclude
a contribution of posterior hippocampus to the inhibition of
extinction recall in humans. However, any contribution has to
be weighed against an active contribution from more anterior
hippocampal areas, supporting the recall of extinction
memory.
Any recall test in the absence of paired UCSs is necessarily
accompanied by ongoing extinction, usually restricting CR
recovery to one or a few initial CS presentations. fMRI design
constraints, however, require that conditions are presented
repeatedly, forcing us to induce CR recovery over 16 blocks of
context A. This was achieved here by combining renewal with
reinstatement. In renewal, CS-induced CR recovery is facili-
tated by presenting the CS in the same context as during initial
conditioning. In reinstatement, CS-evoked recall of fear mem-
ory is facilitated by unpaired UCS presentations in the same
context in which the CS is presented. A limitation of this study
is therefore that we are unable to differentiate between renewal
and reinstatement effects on recall of fear memory. This makes
any conclusions derived about recall of fear memory (such as
about a possible role of the posterior hippocampus) less
strong than conclusions about context-dependent recall of
extinction memory, for which purpose this study was explic-
itly designed.
Renewal/reinstatement on day 2 was evident from in-
creased reaction times to the CS relative to the CS, al-
though, unexpectedly, there were no skin conductance differ-
ences. We suggest that this behavioral dissociation can be
understood by considering that conditioning is expressed in a
variety of behaviors, making it conceivable that not all behav-
ioral expressions of a CR are produced with each CS presen-
tation. Such a scenario is more likely where CS presentations
are non-reinforced, possibly resulting in on-line extinction,
such as on day 2 here (see above). Dissociations between be-
havioral and physiological measures of emotional reactions
have also been observed in other studies (Johnstone and Page,
2004). It should be noted that reaction times are a valid and
widely used method to measure CRs in humans (Critchley et
al., 2002; Gottfried et al., 2002; Dirikx et al., 2004; Gottfried
and Dolan, 2004; Hermans et al., 2005). They are also widely
used in the assessment of other emotional responses, such as
the attention-grabbing effect of aversive stimuli, in which
their use has plausible theoretical grounds [namely interfer-
ence with cognitive processing by aversive stimuli (Mathews et
al., 1997)]. Nevertheless, the observed dissociation suggests
caution in the interpretation of our data and warrants inde-
pendent confirmation of our results by future studies.
We did not observe any significant negative correlation be-
tween VMPFC and amygdala. This may reflect the fact that
VMPFC-dependent suppression of CS-evoked amygdala out-
put involves both excitation (of direct VMPFC target neurons in
lateral amygdala or intercalated cell masses) and inhibition (of
amygdala output neurons, possibly by inhibitory VMPFC target
neurons) (Quirk et al., 2003; Rosenkranz et al., 2003; Pare et al.,
2004). Given the low spatial resolution of fMRI, both effects may
cancel each other out.
We have discussed our findings in terms of extinction, but
it is important to acknowledge that a conditioned inhibition
(CI) framework provides an alternative account of our data. In
CI, conditioning to a first CS (“target” stimulus T) is followed
by a training phase in which T is presented together with a
second CS (“feature” stimulus F) but without the UCS (Pav-
lov, 1927). Hence, F comes to predict absence of the UCS,
resulting in an inhibitory F–noUCS memory trace. In the
present experiment, the CS could be conceptualized as T and
the extinction context B as F. CR inhibition would then be
mainly conveyed by a F–noUCS association (i.e., the extinc-
tion context itself) and not, as in the case of extinction, by a
CS–noUCS association (the extinction memory). Neverthe-
less, current models of CI (Pearce and Hall, 1980; Wagner and
Brandon, 1989; Nelson and Bouton, 1997) assume that, simi-
lar to extinction, T (i.e., the CS) also acquires some inhibi-
tory properties. Furthermore, in the case of extinction, when
one recalls an extinction memory in its extinction context, the
context will contribute to the activation of the inhibitory as-
sociation of the CS, that is, will contribute to inhibition.
Therefore, CI and the type of contextualized extinction inves-
tigated here are conceptually hard to distinguish. It should
also be noted that current theories do not distinguish between
an “extinction”–inhibition and a “CI”–inhibition but treat all
inhibition the same, suggesting that either account is appro-
priate to describe our data.
Little has been known about the context-dependent recall
of extinction memory in humans. A key feature of this study is
that our design allows delineation of the neural circuitry in-
volved in that function, using a psychological manipulation
that engenders recall of extinction memory in the appropriate
context. Clinically, contextual restrictions on extinction can
considerably complicate anxiety therapy, sometimes resulting
in fear recovery in nontherapy contexts even after successful
fear extinction. For therapeutic purposes, therefore, it may
often be desirable to create noncontextualized extinction
memories. Our data suggest that such decontextualization
may be achieved by rendering the VMPFC-dependent recall of
extinction memories hippocampus independent. New phar-
macological treatments facilitating the consolidation of ex-
tinction memories (Walker et al., 2002; Ressler et al., 2004)
(for review, see Richardson et al., 2004) may also facilitate
such context-independent activation of the VMPFC (Ledger-
wood et al., 2004).
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SUPPORTING ONLINE MATERIAL 
 
 
Supplemental Table 1: SPM results for the entire scan volume 
 
z-value p-value p-value x y z localization 
 (uncorr.) (SVC) (MNI   space)   
       
(CS+>CS-)A       
3.11 0.001  -50 -62 -2 L middle temporal gyrus 
       
(CS+>CS-)A, RT-modulated 
3.81 <0.001  -22 0 -2 L striatum 
3.73 <0.001  -58 -6 -42 L inferior temporal gyrus 
3.41 <0.001  -40 -54 -4 L lateral occipito- 
   temporal sulcus 
3.34 <0.001  2 -52 -18 cerebellum 
3.29 <0.001  0 -18 -6 hypothalamus 
3.24 0.001 0.045 38 -32 -12 R hippocampus 
3.2 0.001  20 6 -8 R striatum 
2.94 0.002  10 -50 -30 R cerebellum 
2.94 0.002  -28 -2 -32 L amygdala 
2.93 0.002  8 -26 -34 R brainstem 
2.92 0.002  30 -22 -26 R collateral sulcus 
2.90 0.002  -36 -10 -14 L mid-insula 
2.89 0.002  28 14 -28 R inferior insula/ 
   posterior OFC 
      
(CS+>CS-)B      
3.85 <0.001  40 28 -44 R temporal pole 
3.47 <0.001  44 -62 20 R superior temporal  
   sulcus 
3.45 <0.001  -20 -56 -40 L cerebellum 
3.39 <0.001  40 -4 24 R insula 
3.16 0.001  -22 32 40 L superior frontal  
   sulcus 
3.11 0.001  -54 14 -36 L superior temporal  
   gyrus 
       
(CS+>CS-)B, RT-modulated     
3.99 <0.001  22 -108 6 R occipital pole 
3.75 <0.001  -20 -22 -26 L hippocampus/ 
   entorhinal cortex 
3.63 <0.001  -14 -8 -18 L amygdala/ventral  
   striatum 
3.55 <0.001  -22 -10 -10 L ventral striatum 
3.41 <0.001  -30 -76 16 L lateral occipital or  
   superior temporal    
   sulcus 
3.35 <0.001  -2 -74 18 cuneus 
3.28 0.001  -28 -84 2 L lateral occipital sulcus 
 
(CS+>CS-)A > (CS+>CS-)B     
 
no voxels surviving threshold 
    
       
 
(CS+>CS-)A > (CS+>CS-)B, RT-modulated 
3.63 <0.001  -60 -8 -42 L inferior temporal  
   gyrus 
 
(CS+>CS-)B > (CS+>CS-)A     
4.18 <0.001  -30 12 -30 L posterior OFC/ventral  
   insula 
4.01 <0.001 0.011(1) -22 -12 -36 L hippocampus/ 
   entorhinal cortex 
3.67 <0.001 0.043(2) -26 -22 -30 L hippocampus/ 
   entorhinal cortex 
3.55 <0.001 0.048 -2 42 -22 L VMPFC 
3.23 0.001  0 30 -26 VMPFC 
3.54 <0.001  42 30 -40 R temporal pole 
3.51 <0.001 0.062 6 50 -12 R VMPFC 
3.42 <0.001  -16 -56 -36 L cerebellum 
3.37 <0.001  -66 -6 -20 L middle temporal gyrus 
3.3 <0.001  -46 -12 -38 L inferior temporal  
   gyrus 
3.25 0.001  -44 30 -24 L lateral orbital gyrus 
3.18 0.001  -70 -34 2 L superior temporal  
   gyrus 
3.13 0.001  32 -26 -30 R collateral sulcus 
 
 
(CS+>CS-)B > (CS+>CS-)A, RT-modulated 
3.49 <0.001  36 64 -12 R lateral orbital gyrus 
 
 
T-tests, degrees of freedom: 16, statistical threshold P ≤ 0.001 uncorrected, one-tailed, 
unless indicated otherwise. 
ACC: anterior cingulate cortex, OFC: orbital frontal cortex, MNI: Montreal 
Neurological Institute, RT: reaction time, SVC: small volume correction, VMPFC: 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
(1)SVC shifts maximum to -24/-12/-32 
(2)SVC shifts maximum to -26/-18/-26 
 
 
